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I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay focuses on issues raised by two recent appellate court
decisions involving the federal transfer tax treatment of disclaimers.'
A brother and sister disclaimed their remainder interests in a family
trust created by their grandfather, causing their shares of the trust
corpus to pass to their respective issue. The Eleventh Circuit held
that the brother's disclaimer constituted a taxable gift. 2 The Eighth
Circuit initially reached the same conclusion concerning the sister's
disclaimer, but on rehearing held that the sister's disclaimer was not a
taxable gift. 3 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the
Eighth Circuit's decision.'
The Eighth Circuit's decision rests on a misreading of applicable
law and sows the seeds of confusion concerning the federal transfer
tax treatment of disclaimers. The decision merits reversal both
because it is wrong and, more importantly, because it threatens to
breed litigation and disrupt the administration of federal transfer
taxes. As long-term family trusts established in the early part of this
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to
thank John Gaubatz for his helpful comments and Ruth Parlin for her resourcefulness in
locating government documents.
1. Irvine v. United States, 981 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2958
(1993); Ordway v. United States, 908 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2916
(1991).
2. Ordway, 908 F.2d at 896.

3. Irvine v. United States, 936 F.2d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 1991), on reh'g, 981 F.2d 991, 996
(8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
4. Irvine v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993).
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century terminate, remainder beneficiaries will undoubtedly seek to
shift valuable interests to younger-generation beneficiaries free of gift
tax. In its eagerness to salvage one flawed estate plan, the Eighth
Circuit has sidestepped Supreme Court precedent and turned the tax
concept of a "transfer" on its head.
II.

THE ORDWAY TRUST CASES

In 1917, Lucius P. Ordway created an irrevocable inter vivos
trust (the "Ordway Trust"), naming his wife Jessie and their five children as concurrent life income beneficiaries. 5 On the death of the last
surviving income beneficiary, the trust corpus was to be paid in equal
shares to Lucius's grandchildren, with the issue of any deceased
grandchild taking that grandchild's share.6
The Ordway Trust terminated with the death of Katharine,
Lucius's last surviving child, on June 27, 1979. At Katharine's death,
the trust corpus became distributable in thirteen equal shares to
Lucius's twelve living grandchildren and the issue of a deceased

grandchild.7 Within two months after Katharine's death, two of the
grandchildren, Sally Ordway Irvine and her brother John G. Ordway,
Jr., filed partial disclaimers of their respective interests in the trust
8
corpus.
The state disclaimer statute in force in 1979 permitted a disclaimer of a future interest "at any time after the creation of the interest, but . . .not later than six months after the event which would
cause [the disclaimant] to become finally ascertained [as a beneficiary]
5. Irvine, 981 F.2d at 992-93.
6. See id. Under the trust agreement, Jessie was to receive a $14,000 annuity for life, and
the remaining net income was to be divided among the five children in equal shares. After the
death of a child survived by a spouse or issue, the child's share of net income was to be paid to
the child's spouse (until remarriage) and "children." On termination of the trust at the death
of the last survivor of Jessie and the five children, the corpus was to be distributed "in equal
shares to each of [Lucius's] grand children per capita and not per sturpes [sic]. If any of
[Lucius's] grand children shall then have died leaving issue, said children [sic] shall be entitled
to equal portions of the share of said deceased grand child." Ordway Trust Agreement dated
January 16, 1917.
7. Irvine, 981 F.2d at 993.
8. Sally disclaimed an undivided 31.25% portion of her share of the trust corpus on
August 21, 1979. See id. at 993. John disclaimed an undivided 11.52% portion of his share of
the trust corpus on August 23, 1979. See Ordway v. United States, 908 F.2d 890, 892 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II1 S.Ct. 2916 (1991). Several other grandchildren also disclaimed
their respective shares of the trust corpus in whole or in part. See In re Ordway Trust, No.
365266 (Ramsey County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 1979) (order confirming validity and effect of
disclaimers under state law). At least one of these disclaimers has given rise to federal tax
litigation. See Johnson v. United States, No. 89-8192CV (S.D. Fla. Jan 26, 1993) (order
closing case for administrative purposes only); Johnson v. United States, No. 89-CV-265 (D.
Minn. Sept. 1, 1989) (order staying proceedings).
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and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity." 9 In an uncontested proceeding, a state court confirmed the
validity of the two grandchildren's disclaimers under the state disclaimer statute.' 0 As a result of the disclaimers, each grandchild's
disclaimed interest in the trust corpus became payable to the
grandchild's issue as if the grandchild had died immediately before
Katharine. II
Sally and John disclosed their disclaimers on their third-quarter
1979 gift tax returns, taking the position that the disclaimers had no
federal gift tax consequences. On audit the government determined
that the disclaimers constituted indirect gifts and assessed gift taxes,
which the grandchildren paid.' 2 After disallowance of their refund
claims, Sally's personal representatives and John brought separate
refund actions in federal district courts. In 1989, both district courts
granted summary judgment for the taxpayers. 13 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Ordway v. United
States,'4 and the Eighth Circuit initially followed suit in Irvine v.
United States.'5 Subsequently, however, the Eighth Circuit vacated
its panel decision and affirmed the district court's decision en banc,' 6
thereby creating a split between the circuits and prompting the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari."
III.

THE FEDERAL TRANSFER TAX CONTEXT

The Ordway Trust cases graphically illustrate the importance of
determining the federal transfer tax consequences of a disclaimer separately from its characterization under state property law. A disclaimer is an affirmative refusal to accept a donative transfer of an
interest in property. State disclaimer statutes typically treat a disclaimed interest as passing directly from the original transferor to the
ultimate takers, as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the
9. MINN. STAT. § 501.211, subd. 3 (1978).
10. See In re Ordway Trust, No. 365266 (Ramsey County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 1979).
The government conceded the validity of the disclaimers under the Minnesota disclaimer
statute in both tax refund suits. See Irvine, 981 F.2d at 993; Ordway, 908 F.2d at 892.
11. See MINN. STAT. § 501.211, subd. 5 (1978). Sally's disclaimed interest passed to her
five children. Irvine, 981 F.2d at 993. John's disclaimed interest passed to his three children.
Ordway, 908 F.2d at 892.
12. Irvine, 981 F.2d at 993; Ordway, 908 F.2d at 892.
13. See Ordway v. United States, 89-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 13,802, at 88,153 (S.D. Fla.
1989); Irvine v. United States, 818 F. Supp. 272 (D. Minn. 1989). Sally died in 1987; her
refund suit was filed by her personal representatives.
14. 908 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2916 (1991).
15. 936 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1991).
16. Irvine v. United States, 981 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
17. Irvine v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993).
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original transfer.' 8 In accordance with the legal fiction of the disclaimant's death, state property law generally treats the disclaimant as
never having owned or transferred the disclaimed interest. 9
A transaction characterized as a valid disclaimer under state law
may nevertheless constitute a transfer for federal transfer tax purposes. The gift tax reaches any "transfer of property by gift," including the release of an unrestricted power to acquire ownership of
property as well as a direct or indirect transfer of a beneficial interest
in owned property. 2° For example, a parent's interest-free loan to a
child may be recharacterized for tax purposes as a gift of the foregone
interest by the parent coupled with deemed payments of interest at a
market rate by the child.2 ' Similarly, the gift tax concept of a transfer
is sufficiently expansive to treat a disclaimant as constructively receiving the disclaimed interest from the original transferor and then making a second transfer to the ultimate takers.22 Accordingly, the
provisions recognizing tax-free disclaimers carve out limited exceptions to the general rule of taxability.23
The current gift tax provisions concerning disclaimers reflect the
historical development of an independent federal standard. Section
18. See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT, § 4, 8A U.L.A. 85 (1978). By
contrast, the applicable state disclaimer statute in the Ordway Trust cases treated the
disclaimers as relating back to Katharine's death in 1979 rather than to the creation of the
trust in 1917. See MINN. STAT. § 501.211, subd. 5 (1978).
19. On the definition and operation of disclaimers under state property law generally, see 6
WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS ch. 49, at 36-57
(rev. ed. 1960 & 1992 Supp.); I AUSTIN W. ScoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 36.1, at 389-400 (4th ed. 1987).
20. See I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(1) (gift tax imposed on "transfer of property by gift"), 251 l(a)
(gift tax applies "whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or
indirect"), 2514(b) (exercise or release of general power of appointment created after October
21, 1942 treated as transfer of underlying property); Treas. Reg. § 25.251 14I(c)(1) (gift subject
to tax includes "any transaction in which an interest in property is gratuitously passed or
conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed"). Unless otherwise
indicated, all I.R.C. and Treas. Reg. references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended through August 1993 and Treasury Regulations as amended in 1986, respectively.
See also H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., at 27-28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
(Part 2) 457, 476; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
(Part 2) 496, 524.
21. See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
22. See Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 310 (1982) (gift tax definition of transfer
"unquestionably encompasses an indirect transfer, effected by means of a disclaimer, of a
contingent future interest in a trust"). For an excellent discussion of the transfer tax treatment
of disclaimers, see John H. Martin, Perspectives on FederalDisclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 316, 356-61 (1979).
23. See I.R.C. § 2518(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(d)(6), 20.2055-2(c), 20.2056(d),
25.25111(c), 25.2514-3(c)(5)-(6). One commentator perceptively describes a disclaimer as "a
transfer that is not treated as a transfer for tax purposes." Mitchell M. Gans, Disclaimers,
INST. ON FED. TAX'N, § 52.01, at 52-1 (1988).
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2518 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to any disclaimer of an
interest created by a transfer made after 1976.24 In the case of an
interest created by a pre-1977 transfer, however, the current gift tax
treatment of a disclaimer is governed by a regulation originally
promulgated in 1958 and effective for gifts made after 1954 (the "Regulation").25 To escape treatment as a transfer for gift tax purposes,
the Regulation requires that a disclaimer be effective under state law
and be made "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer" and before any acceptance of ownership. 26 Thus,
the Regulation not only incorporates the standards of state law but
also superimposes independent federal requirements of timeliness and
non-acceptance. 2 7
24. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893
(enacting section 2518); id. § 2009(e)(2) (effective date). Section 2518 currently provides that a
disclaimer is not treated as a transfer for federal transfer tax purposes if it is made in writing
and delivered not later than nine months after the transfer creating the interest (or, if later, the
day the disclaimant reaches age 21); in addition, the disclaimant must not have accepted the
disclaimed property or any of its benefits, and the disclaimed property must pass as a result of
the disclaimer to a person other than the disclaimant or the transferor's spouse. I.R.C. § 2518.
25. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (promulgated by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 643-44).
26. The Regulation currently provides:
The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, any transaction in which
an interest in property is gratuitously passed or conferred upon another,
regardless of the means or device employed, constitutes a gift subject to tax....
In the case of taxable transfers creating an interest in the person disclaiming
made before January 1, 1977, where the law governing the administration of the
decedent's estate gives a beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right completely and
unqualifiedly to refuse to accept ownership of property transferred from a
decedent (whether the transfer is effected by the decedent's will or by the law of
descent and distribution) a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the
making of a gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of
the existence of the transfer. The refusal must be unequivocal and effective under
the local law. There can be no refusal of ownership of property after its
acceptance. In the absence of the facts to the contrary, if a person fails to refuse
to accept a transfer to him of ownership of a decedent's property within a
reasonable time after learning of the existence of the transfer, he will be
presumed to have accepted the property.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c).
27. In Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 316 (1982), the Supreme Court stated: "The
Regulation explicitly imposes two requirements: (1) the disclaimer must be effective as a
matter of local law; and (2) the disclaimer must be made within a reasonable time. If
timeliness were governed solely by local law, the second requirement would be redundant.
While it is possible that local law may require a disclaimer to be timely to be effective, such a
requirement would not absolve the taxpayer from the separate timeliness requirement imposed
by the federal Regulation." In Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961), the Tax Court
held that a widow's attempted disclaimer in 1956 of an income interest in a testamentary trust
established by her husband, who died in 1931, failed to meet the timeliness and non-acceptance
requirements of the Regulation. "The gift tax attaches here regardless of the validity of any
renunciation under Pennsylvania law because whatever renunciation there may have been did
not, within the provisions of the statute and regulations, take place under such circumstances
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In Jewett v. Commissioner,28 the Supreme Court focused on the
meaning of "transfer" in the Regulation as applied to a contingent
remainder following several life income interests under a testamentary
trust.29 The Court concluded that the transfer triggering the disclaimer period for gift tax purposes occurred at the creation of the
trust in 1939. Accordingly, the attempted disclaimer of the remainder in 1972, though concededly valid under state law, failed to meet
the timeliness requirement of the Regulation and thus constituted a
taxable transfer.3 ° In Jewett, the Court squarely rejected the position,
successfully asserted by taxpayers in two previous Eighth Circuit
cases, that the Regulation merely tracked state property law and permitted tax-free disclaimers to be made within a reasonable time after
the time for indefeasible vesting of the disclaimed interest. 3'
The continuing impact of Jewett is evident from the persistent
efforts of taxpayers to circumvent its holding in litigated cases 32 and
as to eliminate the applicability of gift tax to petitioner in having at least 'indirectly' made a
gift in 1956." Id. at 155. In one early case arising before the enactment of the federal gift tax,
however, a court concluded that a disclaimer could be taxed as a transfer in contemplation of
death only if state property law treated the disclaimant as having accepted the interest and
then retransferred it to the ultimate takers. See Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
28. 455 U.S. 305 (1982).
29. Jewett involved a testamentary trust created in 1939 which was to pay income first to
the settlor's husband and then to her son and his wife for their respective lives, and to
distribute corpus to the son's children (or issue) living at the death of the last surviving income
beneficiary. In 1972, while the last income beneficiary was still living, one of the son's adult
children disclaimed his contingent remainder interest in half the corpus (while retaining his
interest in any income that might subsequently be accumulated). Id. at 306-07. The Court
framed the issue as "whether the 'transfer' referred to in the Regulation occurs when the
interest is created, as the Government contends, or at a later time when the interest either vests
or becomes possessory, as argued by petitioner." Id. at 306.
30. Id. at 318-19.
31. See Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1980); Keinath v.
Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973); cf Jewett, 455 U.S. at 308-09 (noting conflict with
Jewett v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980)).
32. For example, in Griswold v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 141 (1983), the Tax Court
rejected the taxpayers' attempt to recast Jewett as holding that the Regulation treats a
disclaimer as a gift if it is not made "'within a reasonable time after the taxpayer has actual
knowledge of the specific terms of. . . [his] interest and of the nature and value of the trust
property.'" Id. at 152 n. 12 (quoting taxpayers' supplemental brief). The court described the
taxpayers' position as "an attempt to make an end run on the rationale of [Jewett]." Id. at 155
n.18. See also Hallenbeck v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1204 (1983) (same trust,
different disclaimant). Similarly, in Poinierv. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 478 (1986), aff'd in part,
858 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming this issue), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019 (1989), the Tax
Court and the Third Circuit rejected the taxpayer's argument that the Supreme Court might
have decided Jewett differently had it been aware of the government's allegedly inconsistent
private ruling position. See Poinier, 86 T.C. at 485 ("Petitioners are grasping at straws.");
Poinier, 858 F.2d at 919 ("Whatever merit [the argument that Jewett was wrongly decided]
might have if addressed to the Supreme Court, it is not one that this intermediate appellate
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in proposed legislation. 33 A taxpayer who has a contingent or defeasible future interest created by a pre-1977 transfer has much to gain and
little to lose (other than lobbying and litigation costs) by disclaiming
the interest promptly after it becomes indefeasibly vested. If the disclaimer constitutes a taxable transfer, the taxpayer may avoid a taxinclusive estate tax at the cost of a tax-exclusive gift tax. 34 If the tax-

payer successfully distinguishes Jewett, the underlying property may
pass to the ultimate takers with no additional transfer tax. The
Ordway Trust disclaimers represent calculated gambles testing the
limits of Jewett.
IV.

THE ORDWAY TRUST DISCLAIMERS IN PERSPECTIVE

The solution to the Ordway Trust cases should be quite straightforward. Since the facts of both cases are essentially identical and
uncontested, the federal gift tax treatment of the grandchildren's disclaimers presents a technical problem of determining the applicable
legal standard under the relevant statutes, regulations, and case law.
At the same time, the solution to the cases depends on how the issues
are framed. To dispel the confusion evident in the several appellate
opinions, it is important to order the issues in a manner that is both
accurate from a technical standpoint and sound as a matter of tax
policy.

A.

Does the Regulation Apply?

The threshold issue is whether the Regulation, which by its own
terms applies to disclaimers of interests created by "taxable transfers"
occurring before 1977, governs the gift tax treatment of the Ordway
Trust disclaimers. In reaching its conclusion that the Regulation did
not apply to Sally's disclaimer, the Eighth Circuit noted that the discourt may consider."); see also Estate of Bunn v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 547, 549 (1983)
(rejecting as "frivolous" the argument that Jewett was wrongly decided).
33. See H.R. 3323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1987); H.R. 3838, Part 2, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 1617 (1986); H.R. 2583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1983, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 7601, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1238
(1984); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, EXPLANATION OF MISCELLANEOUS TAX PROPOSALS
28-29 (Jt. Comm. Print 1990); see also Letter from Amory Houghton, Jr., to G. William
Miller, Secretary of the Treasury (May 5, 1980), reprinted in 10 TAX NOTES 857 (1980)
(Houghton was one of the taxpayers in Griswold).
34. The annual exclusion and unified credit may shelter all or part of the value of the
disclaimed interest from gift tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 2505(a). If the taxpayer dies within
three years after making the disclaimer, any gift tax paid by the taxpayer will be included in
the gross estate. I.R.C. § 2035(c). Post-disclaimer appreciation in the value of the disclaimed
property, however, will escape both gift and estate tax, assuming the taxpayer retained no
beneficial interest in or control over the disclaimed interest.
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claimed interest was created in 1917-15 years before the enactment
of the federal gift tax-by a transfer that could not have constituted a
taxable gift." Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit saw "no occasion to
consider the issues concerning the impact of [the Regulation] on
[Sally's] disclaimer. 'a6 By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted
the term "taxable transfer" in the Regulation to mean " 'any transaction in which an interest in property is gratuitously passed or conferred upon another,' even if that transaction was not subject to the
gift tax." 3 1 Under this definition, the Eleventh Circuit had no difficulty in applying the Regulation to John's disclaimer.
In interpreting "taxable transfer," the Eleventh Circuit referred
to a regulation which provides that the 9-month period for making a
qualified disclaimer under section 2518 generally runs from the time
of "the taxable transfer creating the interest. '38 Although the section
2518 regulations do not apply directly to the Ordway Trust disclaimers,3 9 they provide a key to the proper interpretation of the
Regulation.
The reference to taxable transfers was inserted into the Regulation in 1986, in connection with the promulgation of the final section
2518 regulations.' Aside from limiting the scope of the Regulation,
the 1986 amendments made no change in the substance of the Regulation as originally promulgated in 1958. Indeed, the reference in the
Regulation to taxable transfers, like the parallel reference in the section 2518 regulations,4 1 serves merely to demarcate disclaimers which
are governed by section 2518 (i.e., disclaimers of interests created by
taxable transfers made after 1976) from those which remain subject to
the Regulation (i.e., disclaimers of interests created by taxable transfers made before 1977). The most sensible conclusion is that the 1986
35. See Irvine v. United States, 981 F.2d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 1992). The gift tax applies to
gifts made after June 6, 1932, the date of enactment. See I.R.C. § 2502(b); Revenue Act of
1932, ch. 209, § 501(a), 47 Stat. 169, 245; H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28
(1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457, 476; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 524.
36. Irvine, 981 F.2d at 996.
37. Ordway v. United States, 908 F.2d 890, 895 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
38. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3).
39. The section 2518 regulations apply to a disclaimer of an interest created by a "taxable
transfer" made after 1976. Id. § 25.2518-1(a). The 9-month period for making a qualified
disclaimer generally runs from the time of the post-1976 "taxable transfer" creating the
interest. Id. § 25.2518-2(c)(3). By contrast, the reasonable time for making a disclaimer runs
from the time the disclaimant learns of the existence of the pre-1977 "transfer" creating the
interest. Id. § 25.2511-(c)(2).
40. See T.D. 8095, 1986-2 C.B. 160 (promulgating final regulations under section 2518
and revising miscellaneous estate and gift tax regulations concerning disclaimers).
41. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(a).
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amendments to the Regulation merely implement the superseding
provisions of section 2518, leaving the Regulation unchanged in its
application to the Ordway Trust disclaimers. This conclusion is fully
consistent with the effective-date provision of the statute that the 1986
amendments purport to implement. 2
Why then does the Regulation refer to "taxable transfers"? The
most plausible answer lies in the problems that would arise if the Regulation defined its scope simply by referring to the time of the "transfer" creating the disclaimed interest.4 3 For example, the creation of a
revocable trust constitutes a "transfer" for estate tax purposes but
does not constitute a completed transfer for gift tax purposes.' A gift
of property subject to a retained life estate constitutes a completed gift
of the remainder and may also trigger estate tax inclusion. 45 By referring to disclaimers of interests created by "taxable transfers" before
1977, the Regulation avoids these problems but also creates some new
ones. The section 2518 regulations provide an extensive gloss which
makes clear that a "taxable transfer" may include various transfers on
which no immediate gift or estate tax is actually imposed. 6 Identifying when a taxable transfer occurs may still raise technical problems
in determining whether to test the timeliness of a disclaimer under
section 2518 or the Regulation.4 7 Nevertheless, lingering ambiguities
42. Section 2518 applies "with respect to transfers creating an interest . .. made after
December 31, 1976." Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(e)(2), 90 Stat.
1520, 1893. The legislative history confirms that "[i]nthe case of transfers made before
January 1, 1977, the rules relating to disclaimers under present law, including the period
within which a disclaimer must be made, are to continue to apply to disclaimers made after
December 31, 1976." H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68 (1976), reprinted in
1976-3 C.B. 735, 801-02 (1976); accord JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 592 (Jt. Comm. Print
1976), reprinted in 1976-2 C.B. 1, 604 (1976).
43. As originally proposed in 1980, the amended Regulation would have applied to
disclaimers of interests created by "transfers" made before 1977, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.25111(c)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 48922, 48924-25 (1980), and the section 2518 regulations would have
applied to disclaimers of interests created by "transfers" made after 1976, id. § 25.2518-1(a),
45 Fed. Reg. at 48925.
44. See I.R.C. § 2038(a) (estate tax); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (gift tax) (as amended in
1983).
45. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (estate tax); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (gift tax). If the
remainder beneficiary is a member of the settlor's family, the entire value of the underlying
property may be subject to gift tax. See I.R.C. § 2702.
46. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3) ("taxable transfer" triggering 9-month disclaimer
period includes transfer qualifying for section 2503(b) exclusion or 2056(b)(7) marital
deduction). Although not specifically enumerated, transfers qualifying for a section 2503(e)
exclusion, a section 2522 or 2055 charitable deduction, or a section 2523 or 2056 marital
deduction presumably represent additional examples of "taxable transfers" that do not trigger
immediate gift or estate tax.
47. See Kennedy v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986) (disclaimer period began
to run at deceased joint tenant's death with respect to survivor's accretive share); see also

1052

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1043

in the application of section 2518 should not cloud the issue of
whether the Regulation applies to the Ordway Trust disclaimers.
The Regulation applies to "the transfer of property by gift" in
calendar periods after 1954.48 The question therefore becomes
whether the Ordway Trust disclaimers are to be viewed as "transfers"
for federal gift tax purposes and, if so, whether they occurred after
1954. A disclaimer inherently involves both an original transfer in
which a transferor creates an interest in the disclaimant and a potential second transfer in which the disclaimant shifts that interest to the
ultimate takers by refusing ownership.
The Regulation treats a disclaimer of an interest created by a
pre-1977 transfer as a gift unless the disclaimer meets the requirements of state property law and also meets independent federal
requirements of timeliness and non-acceptance.49 If the disclaimer
meets those requirements, the disclaimant's "refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the making of a gift" by the disclaimant;
instead, both transfers are collapsed and treated as a single transfer
made by the original transferor to the ultimate takers.5" Thus, if the
Ordway Trust disclaimers are respected for gift tax purposes, the Regulation views the remainder interests as being transferred only once,
when Lucius created the trust in 1917. On the other hand, if the disclaimers constitute gifts, the Regulation views the remainder interests
as being transferred a second time, when the grandchildren finally
decided not to accept possession in 1979. Lucius made a gift in 1917,
before the enactment of the federal gift tax; the grandchildren made
gifts, if at all, in 1979, after the effective date of the Regulation.
Accordingly, the Regulation (as amended in 1986"1) governs the gift
tax treatment of the Ordway Trust disclaimers.
B. Does Jewett Control?
The timeliness of the Ordway Trust disclaimers under the ReguMcDonald v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1494 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989)
(following Kennedy); A.O.D. 1990-06 (announcing acquiescence in McDonald and retreating
from inconsistent position of Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(4)).
48. See Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1(a) (as amended in 1992); T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627.
49. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-l(c)(2); cf I.R.C. § 2518(a) (qualified disclaimer treated for
transfer tax purposes "as if the [disclaimed] interest had never been transferred to [the
disclaimant]").
51. Unless otherwise provided, Treasury regulations relate back to the effective date of the
statutory provisions they implement. See I.R.C. § 7805(a), (b). The 1986 amendments to the
Regulation implement provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 that supersede prior law with
respect to disclaimers of interests created by transfers made after 1976. See T.D. 8095, 1986-2
C.B. 160.
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lation depends on whether Sally and John disclaimed "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer."' 2 The
taxpayer in Jewett attempted to make a tax-free disclaimer in 1972 of
a contingent remainder interest in a testamentary trust created in
1939. The Supreme Court, however, held that the "transfer"
occurred when the interest was originally created rather than when it
vested in interest or possession, and concluded that the disclaimer
3
constituted a taxable transfer.'
Because the Ordway Trust disclaimers occurred in 1979, three
years before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Jewett, the
taxpayers in Irvine argue that Sally's disclaimer should be governed
by the interpretation of the Regulation prevailing in 1979.1' Generally, however, when the Supreme Court applies a holding to the parties before it in a civil case, the holding has full precedential effect in
pending and future cases from the time it is announced, regardless of
when the underlying transactions occurred." By applying its holding
in Jewett to the parties before it, the Supreme Court impliedly held
that its interpretation of the Regulation would be given full retroac6
tive effect.'
Moreover, as a matter of common sense, Jewett should control
the Regulation as applied to the Ordway Trust disclaimers. Under
the Regulation, failure to disclaim an interest within a reasonable time
after knowledge of the transfer constitutes an acceptance, which precludes a subsequent disclaimer.' 7 A contingent future interest repre52. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(2).
53. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1982).
54. Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Eighth Circuit panel refused to consider arguments
for nonretroactive application of Jewett. See Ordway v. United States, 908 F.2d 890, 896 (11 th
Cir. 1990) (taxpayer failed to raise issue); Irvine v. United States, 936 F.2d 343, 348-49 (8th
Cir. 1991) (same). On rehearing, the Eighth Circuit found that the Regulation did not apply at
all, and therefore did not address the issue. See Irvine v. United States, 981 F.2d 991, 996 (8th
Cir. 1992). Even under the balancing test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971),
invoked by the taxpayers in Irvine, it seems likely that Sally took a calculated risk in view of
the unsettled state of the law in 1979. See Cottrell v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 489 (1979), rev'd,
628 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1980); Estate of Halbach v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 141 (1978); Jewett
v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 430 (1978), aff'd, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 305
(1982); Keinath v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 352 (1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
55. For example, the holding in Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984), that
interest-free loans to family members may constitute gifts has been given full retroactive effect.
See, e.g., Cohen v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1990); Estate of Arbury v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 136 (1989). Courts have consistently rejected attempts to distinguish
or reconsider the Jewett holding. See supra note 32.
56. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993); James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2445-51 (1991) (plurality disapproving selective
nonretroactivity).
57. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(2).
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sents a presently existing, transferable interest in property, even if its
value must be discounted to reflect the uncertainty of future possession. The Regulation draws no distinction between present and future
interests, or between vested and contingent future interests, in determining whether a disclaimer is timely. Under a uniform interpretation of the Regulation, the time of creation rather than the time of
vesting in interest or possession makes sense as a means of requiring
that a beneficiary decide promptly whether to disclaim or accept a
future interest.5"
In effect, the Eighth Circuit in Irvine resurrected the discredited
approach of Keinath v. Commissioner,59 which apparently would treat
the term "transfer" as referring in some cases (viz., present interests
and indefeasibly vested remainders) to the time of creation but in
others (viz., contingent future interests and vested remainders subject
to divestment) to the time of vesting in interest or possession.' The
Eighth Circuit's interpretation creates an unwarranted disparity
between indefeasibly vested remainders and other future interests, by
requiring prompt disclaimers of the former but not the latter. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation overlooks the substantial
benefit, in terms of estate planning, enjoyed by a beneficiary who can
wait for an extended period to decide whether or not to accept a
future interest. 6'
Finally, the approach of Jewett, requiring that a disclaimer generally be made promptly after the creation of an interest rather than
after vesting in interest or possession, facilitates orderly administration of federal transfer taxes. In the case of a taxable transfer of a
future interest, the transferee's identity may have important tax consequences. For example, the transfer may qualify for a marital deduc58. "The Regulation also requires 'knowledge of the existence of the transfer'; since a
person to whom assets have actually been distributed would seldom, if ever, lack knowledge of
the existence of such a transfer, it seems more likely that this provision was drafted to protect
persons who had no knowledge of the creation of the interest." Jewett, 455 U.S. at 312.
59. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. The Eighth Circuit apparently took the position that the term "transfer" in the
Regulation referred to the time of creation in the case of an indefeasibly vested remainder but
to the time of vesting in interest or possession-the court did not specify which-in the case of
a contingent remainder (or a remainder vested subject to divestment). See id. at 63. By
contrast, the Supreme Court in Jewett attached no importance for transfer tax purposes to the
technical distinction between a contingent remainder and a vested remainder subject to
divestment. See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 308-09 n.5.
61. See Griswold v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 141, 153-54 (1983); Jewett, 455 U.S. at 316
n.17; Estate of Halbach v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 141, 146 (1978); Estate of Hoenig v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471, 477 (1976). But cf. Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 64-65
(8th Cir. 1973) (implying no economic benefit prior to vesting).
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tion if the interest passes to the transferor's spouse,6 2 or it may be
subject to special gift tax valuation rules if the transferee is a "member
of the transferor's family, ' 63 or it may avoid triggering a generationskipping transfer tax if the transferee is a "non-skip person." 64 In
each case, however, a disclaimer by the original transferee might shift
the interest to another person and produce dramatically different tax
results. Permitting a transferee to make a tax-free disclaimer after the
expiration of the limitation period for assessing tax on the original
transfer would create uncertainty and severely disrupt transfer tax
administration.
C.

"Retroactivity" and Fairness

The Eighth Circuit in Irvine was apparently concerned that
treating Sally's disclaimer as a taxable transfer would constitute an
impermissible "retroactive" application of the gift tax. 65 Although
the gift tax does not apply to completed transfers made before June 7,
1932,66 the Eighth Circuit made a leap of logic in assuming that
Sally's disclaimer related back to the creation of the Ordway Trust in
1917.67 This assumption makes it impossible to determine the gift tax
consequences of Sally's disclaimer under the Regulation or any other
federal gift tax standard applicable to transfers made in 1979.68 In
62. See I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523. A future interest may qualify for a marital deduction
(notwithstanding the "terminable interest" rule), although the amount of the deduction may
be reduced to reflect postponed possession. On the other hand, no marital deduction is
available for an interest that passes to another person as a result of a disclaimer by the spouse.
63. See I.R.C. § 2702. For example, the special valuation rules apply when a settlor
creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust, retaining an income interest and transferring the
remainder to the settlor's sibling. The rules do not apply, however, if the remainder passes to
the sibling's child as a result of a disclaimer by the sibling. See I.R.C. §§ 2702(e), 2704(c)(2)
(defining "member of the transferor's family").
64. See I.R.C. § 2613. For example, there is ordinarily no generation-skipping transfer
when a settlor creates a trust to accumulate income for 10 years and then distribute corpus to
the transferor's children. If a living child's share passes to the child's issue as a result of a
disclaimer by the child, a generation-skipping transfer will occur no later than the time for
distribution of corpus. See I.R.C. §§ 2611, 2612 (defining "generation-skipping transfer").
65. See Irvine v. United States, 981 F.2d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 1992).
66. The gift tax applies to gifts made after June 6, 1932, the date of enactment. See supra
note 35.
67. The district courts shared the Eighth Circuit's confusion concerning the date to which
the grandchildren's disclaimers related back. See Ordway v. United States, 89-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 88,153, 88,156 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (assuming John's disclaimer related back to creation of
interest in 1917); Irvine v. United States, 818 F. Supp. 272, 275 (D. Minn. 1989) (assuming
disclaimer in Jewett related back to creation of interest in 1939).
68. Even under the state property law standard proposed by the taxpayers in Irvine, the
Eighth Circuit's premise is flawed. Under applicable state law, Sally's disclaimer related back
to the time her remainder interest became "indefeasibly vested in quality and quantity," (i.e.
Katharine's death in 1979). MINN. STAT. § 501.211, subd. 5 (1978). Apparently, therefore,
even assuming that the disclaimer had the same effect for federal gift tax purposes as for state
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effect, the Eighth Circuit assumed its conclusion that Sally's disclaimer did not constitute a transfer subject to gift tax. The Eighth
Circuit might have avoided this circularity by paying closer attention
to the distinction between Lucius's 1917 non-taxable "transfer" that
created the Ordway Trust and the disputed 1979 taxable "transfer"
that resulted from Sally's disclaimer.
A separate but related argument raised by the taxpayers in Irvine
concerns the perceived unfairness of applying the Regulation (as
interpreted in Jewett) to interests created before the effective date of
the Regulation. 69 The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in
Jewett, finding that the Regulation did not unfairly deprive the taxpayer of any preexisting right to make a tax-free disclaimer because
the taxpayer "never had such a right."7 ° In rejecting the retroactivity
argument, however, the Court noted that the federal gift tax was
already in effect "long before" the creation of the disclaimed interest
71
in 1939.
The taxpayers in Irvine purport to distinguish Jewett on the
ground that the federal gift tax had not yet been enacted when the
Ordway Trust was created in 1917.72 This argument leads back to the
Eighth Circuit's flawed conclusion that the gift tax cannot apply to a
disclaimer of an interest created before June 7, 1932.73 To illustrate
the pernicious implications of that conclusion, imagine a testamentary
trust created in 1917 with dispositive provisions identical to those of
the Ordway Trust.74 Would the Eighth Circuit distinguish its Irvine
property law purposes, Sally owned the remainder interest from 1917 until 1979, and the same
interest shifted to Sally's children as a result of her disclaimer. The transaction functioned as a
gift made by Sally in 1979, within the meaning of the Regulation. Cf Estate of Lang v.
Commissioner, 613 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980) (running of statute of limitations on parent's
outstanding loan to child treated as transfer for gift tax purposes).
69. The Irvine taxpayers argue that under the government's view "Mrs. Irvine's time for
making an effective disclaimer under the 1986 Regulation expired before enactment of the
federal gift tax, before she ever could have known that a disclaimer not yet required under
state law nevertheless would be untimely, and thus taxable, under a federal tax statute not yet
enacted." Brief of Respondents at 14, Irvine (No. 92-1546).
70. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 317 (1982). The Court observed that the
taxpayer's argument "would have more appeal had he attempted to renounce the interest
immediately after the adoption of the 1958 Regulation, rather than some 14 years later." Id.
at 317, n.20.
71. "Indeed petitioner does not argue that taxation of the disclaimers is inconsistent with
the statutory provisions imposing a gift tax, which were enacted long before the petitioner's
interest in the trust was created. The 1958 Regulation was adopted well in advance of the
disclaimers in this case; we see no 'retroactivity' problem." Id. at 317.

72. Brief of Respondents at 12-13, Irvine (No. 92-1546).
73. For an example of a taxable disclaimer made in 1956 of a present income interest

created before the enactment of the gift tax, see Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961).
74. The creation of the testamentary trust would have been subject to estate tax. See
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 201-203, 39 Stat. 756, 777-78.
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holding and apply the Regulation (as interpreted in Jewett) to a 1979
disclaimer of an interest in the hypothetical trust? If so, the result
would be to acknowledge an independent federal timeliness requirement for disclaimers of interests created by "taxable" transfers but
not for disclaimers of interests created by "non-taxable" transfers."
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit's facile distinction between taxable and
non-taxable transfers would compound the confusion engendered by
its interpretation of the Regulation.7 6
V.

REAPPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION

Many of the difficulties surrounding the transfer tax treatment of
disclaimers, both under the Regulation and under section 2518, stem
from the distinction between disclaimers and transfers. More precisely, the concept of a tax-free disclaimer requires that two related
transfers be recast as a single transfer. The disclaimed property is
treated as passing not from the original transferor to the disclaimant
and then from the disclaimant to the ultimate taker, but instead
directly from the original transferor to the ultimate taker. As long as
the formal requirements for a disclaimer are met, the disclaimant's
participation is disregarded and the transaction attracts only a single
gift or estate tax.
In functional terms, a taxpayer's ability to disclaim closely
resembles a general power of appointment: both arrangements offer
the taxpayer an opportunity to accept or reject ownership of the
underlying property.77 The main difference (aside from transfer tax
consequences) is purely formal: a disclaimant must act affirmatively
to avoid ownership while the holder of a general power of appointment must act affirmatively to obtain ownership. 78 Nevertheless, for
75. For example, the creation of a testamentary trust in 1915 would not have been subject
to estate tax. See id. Similarly, the creation of a trust by exercise of a general testamentary
power of appointment in 1917 would not have been taxable. See United States v. Field, 255
U.S. 257 (1921). Would the Eighth Circuit refuse to apply the Regulation (as interpreted in
Jewett) to a 1979 disclaimer of a remainder interest in either trust?
76. For example, it is far from clear how the Eighth Circuit would treat gifts qualifying for
the annual exclusion or the marital or charitable deductions. Although the Eighth Circuit
perceived a "definitive difference" between annual exclusion gifts and completed transfers
occurring before the enactment of the gift tax, it failed to explain why the former were any
more "taxable" than the latter. See Irvine v. United States, 981 F.2d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 1992).
77. See Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 317-18 (1982) (analogy to general power of
appointment).
78. For transfer tax purposes, a power of appointment is disregarded to the extent that the
holder owns an independent beneficial interest in the underlying property. Assume, for
example, that a settlor creates a trust to pay income to the settlor's child for life, remainder as
the child appoints by will or in default of appointment to the child's estate. The child should
be treated as owning the trust property regardless of whether the power of appointment is
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federal transfer tax purposes a disclaimer enjoys tax-free treatment
while a release of a general power of appointment normally constitutes a taxable transfer.79
Not surprisingly, taxpayers and the government have frequently
disagreed over the proper application of the timeliness and nonacceptance requirements of the Regulation. In reality, those requirements are interrelated. The longer a taxpayer may wait before deciding to disclaim, the more likely it becomes that some benefit will have
been accepted. 80 Indeed, it could be argued that by deciding whether
or not to disclaim, the taxpayer unavoidably participates in designating the ultimate taker of the property, and that disclaimers should
generally be treated as taxable transfers.8 '
Tax-free disclaimers, however, have become firmly entrenched in
the federal transfer tax system. Congress has decided to define and
regulate them by imposing formal restrictions and limiting the disclaimant's control over the disposition of the underlying property rather
than by treating all disclaimers as taxable transfers. As a policy matter, this decision can be defended on the ground that post-transfer
flexibility is desirable as long as it does not undermine the integrity of
the transfer tax system. The real problem arises from a tension
between the goal of implementing a uniform federal standard and the
need to rely on non-uniform state property laws in determining the
transfer tax treatment of disclaimers. 82 By imposing independent federal requirements, the Regulation prevents taxpayers from exploiting
state property law doctrine as a short-cut to wholesale tax avoidance.
The Regulation applies to the Ordway Trust disclaimers, and
will continue to apply to disclaimers of other interests created before
1977. Under the Regulation as interpreted in Jewett, the Ordway
Trust disclaimers constituted taxable transfers because they were
untimely for federal tax purposes. The Eighth Circuit's decision
general or non-general. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1961); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2514-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1981).
79. A general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, is generally treated as
equivalent to ownership of the underlying property for federal estate and gift tax purposes. See
I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2514(b). By contrast, a general power of appointment created on or
before October 21, 1942, is taxable only if exercised; a complete release is not taxable. See
I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(1), 2514(a). In a curious reversal of the usual roles, the taxpayers in Irvine
analogize Sally's disclaimer to a release of a pre-1942 general power of appointment. Brief of
Respondents at 28 n.22, Irvine (No. 92-1546).
80. Under a broad reading of the Regulation, a court might find that a taxpayer had
accepted benefits simply by waiting too long to see whether a disclaimer would be
advantageous from an estate-planning perspective. See supra note 61.
81. See Martin, supra note 22.
82. The same tension arises in other contexts as well. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2053(a) (claims
and administration expenses deductible only if allowable under state law).
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offers the Supreme Court a timely opportunity to reaffirm the proper
scope of the Regulation, and in doing so to prevent further unnecessary and wasteful litigation.

